Historical Aggressiveness Index, 1983 -2 020 Aaron Schatz 13 May 2021, 09:44 am
Earlier, the coming week we took a look at Aggressiveness Index numbers for 2020. Today, we’re going to look at historical Aggressiveness Index going all the way back to 1983.
Aggressiveness Index numbers center around 1.0 and generally describe how so much better( or less) likely each coach-and-four is to go for it on fourth down compared against his peers; for example, a coach-and-four with 1.20 AI is approximately 20 percent more likely to go for it than an average coach historically would in equivalent situations. There are other methodologies now for assessing fourth-down aggressiveness, predominantly based on win probability analysis: for example, the EdjSports head coach rankings or results spit out by Ben Baldwin’s fourth-down simulator. Each methodology will have small-minded differences in how it ranks the tutors, but Aggressiveness Index differs from the others by quantify coaches not against what they should do but against the actual decisions just made by coach-and-fours themselves.
The Aggressiveness Index excludes obvious catch-up situations: third one-quarter, trailing by 15 or more points; fourth quarter, trailing by nine or more points; and in the last five minutes of the game, trailing by any quantity. It likewise eliminates the last 10 seconds of the first half, and it adjusts for when a play-act doesn’t actually record as fourth-and-short because of one of those bogus stall of game retributions that moves the punter back five yards. Simply regular season is included.
As we reported on Tuesday, those historical Aggressiveness Index baselines are a lot more conservative compared to how coaches are making decisions in today’s NFL. Philadelphia’s 2017 Super Bowl title helped push along a small-scale analytics revolution on fourth downs. Crews are not going for it as much as analytics would suggest, but since 2018 they are going for it a lot more than they used to. Last-place year, coaches went for it approximately 60% more frequently than we would expect based on historical baselines.
We last-place took a look at historical Aggressiveness Index back in 2013. Since then, we’ve tweaked the formula to lower the strength of plays when the offense was on its own side of the field. These endeavors were already overweighted so that one random go in an unlikely situation would have a outsized consequence on the overall AI. We’ve added 16 different years of play-by-play to our historical data, both 1983 -1 990 and 2013 -2 020. And we’ve added the last three years, where the league as a whole has been much more aggressive than in years past. This seems to be concentrated in two parts of the field: within the 10 and between the 35 -yard paths. Go-for-it rates between the opponent’s 10 – and 35 -yard lines are essentially unchanged.
A look at merely the top dozen chief tutors with a minimum of one year shows you how much things have moved in the last couple of seasons. The top five head coaches, and eight of the top 10, were coaching in the last two seasons. On the other hand, Vic Fangio of the Broncos( 0.62 AI) is the only current chief coach in the bottom 20, again with a minimum of one season.
Highest Aggressiveness Index, 1983 -2 020
( min. 1 season)
Rank Coach Years AI Att Opps Rate Exp Att
1 Kingsbury 2.0 2.45 34 196 17.3% 13.9 2 Stefanski 1.0 2.38 14 80 17.5% 5.9 3 Rhule 1.0 1.89 20 89 22.5% 10.6 4 Pederson 5.0 1.89 83 527 15.7% 43.8 5 Kitchens 1.0 1.84 11 93 11.8% 6.0 6 Cameron 1.0 1.81 13 91 14.3% 7.2 7 LaFleur 2.0 1.71 28 180 15.6% 16.4 8 Nagy 3.0 1.68 34 305 11.1% 20.3 9 Chudzinski 1.0 1.65 12 114 10.5% 7.3 10 Vrabel 3.0 1.59 23 257 8.9% 14.4 11 Brook 2.0 1.54 18 203 8.9% 11.7 12 Coslet 7.8 1.54 95 796 11.9% 61.6
The surprising epithets there are the older tutors , not the recently completed ones 😛 TAGEND
Cam Cameron moved for it on 8 of 11 qualifying fourth-and-1s for the 2007 Dolphins, as opposed to an historic coach average of 39%. He also went for it on both fourth-and-2 and fourth-and-3 in the second quarter against Oakland in Week 4. However, his amounts are a little juiced by that famed play that the Steelers and Dolphins played in a Week 12 monsoon, where Miami went for it twice on fourth-and-long rather than attempting field goals over 40 gardens. Rich Brooks coached the 1995 -1 996 St. Louis Rams and loved his shams. In Week 9 of 1995 againts the Eagles, the Rams moved a sham field goal to convert fourth-and-6 in the second quarter and then a fake punt to convert fourth-and-5 in the third quarter. Brooks likewise had the Rams go for it on 13 of 19 qualifying fourth-and-1s over the two seasons, although he never proceeded for it on 15 qualifying fourth-and-2s. I hope you will forgive me for not going through almost eight full years of Bruce Coslet crews, but Coslet might be the most surprising name on our roll as the most aggressive coach of the previous century over a much longer period of time than these other top tutors. Coslet stood out for going for it instead of kicking long field goals from “no man’s land, ” between the oppose 31 and 37. The historical median in these situations is to go for it 27% of the time. Coslet had his crews go for it on 32 of 53 qualifying opportunities, or 60%. Coslet likewise wasn’t afraid to be really aggressive on fourth-and-short. For example, in late 1996 after taking over the Bengals he had Jeff Blake throw a 12 -yard pass on fourth-and-2 in a tied game against Baltimore Week 15, then had Blake throw a 16 -yard pass the next week on fourth-and-1 when the Bengals were losing to the Oilers by less than a touchdown in the third quarter.
They don’t tend to keep coach-and-fours for long but “youre seeing” the analytic angle of the Cleveland Browns with Kevin Stefanski, Freddie Kitchens, and Rob Chudzinski on the table above as well as Hue Jackson coming in high on the table below.
Before we get to a extremely, very big table with 131 different chief coaches, here’s some other data about going for it in specific situations 😛 TAGEND
There was still 11 different head tutors with a minimum of 3 seasons who have gone for it more than half the time on qualifying fourth-and-1 opportunities. The top six are all recent coaches, with Mike Vrabel, Doug Pederson, and Matt Nagy all over 60%. Don Coryell might be a surprise, at 54%. Then come three longer-tenured coach-and-fours including Bill Parcells( 53% ), Sean Payton( 52% ), and Sam Wyche( 52% ). The brain coaches with a minimum of three seasons who were least likely to go for it on fourth-and-1 include Butch Davis, Brian Billick, and Mike Nolan, all at 21%. Doug Pederson has gone for it on 41% of qualifying fourth-and-2 opportunities, stimulating him the only head coach-and-four with a minimum of three seasons who has gone for it on more than 30% of fourth-and-2s. Frank Reich is second at 29%, with Hue Jackson and Mike Vrabel at 24%. The other specific situation we track is going for it between the resist 31 and 37 instead of kicking a field goal or trying a coffin-corner punt. Three brain coaches with a minimum of 3 seasons went for it at least 50% of the time in these situations. Matt Nagy causes at 74%, followed by Dave Campo (!) at 61% and then Coslet at 60%.
The best instance of a longtime head coach getting more aggressive over the last three years is John Harbaugh. Harbaugh’s Aggressiveness Index through 2017 was 1.04. His AI over the last three years is 2.74, which would be the highest of all time for any head coach with at least one year. Another instance, although not as striking, is Andy Reid. Reid’s AI through his long career until 2017 was 0.81. His AI over the last three years is 1.43.
Bill Belichick, on the other hand, has stayed the same as the conference modifications around him. His AI through 2017 was 1.33. His AI for the last three years is 1.38.
Aggressiveness Index, 1983 -2 020
( min. 3 seasons)
Rank Coach Years AI Att Opps Rate Exp Att
1 Pederson 5.0 1.89 83 527 15.7% 43.8 2 Nagy 3.0 1.68 34 305 11.1% 20.3 3 Vrabel 3.0 1.59 23 257 8.9% 14.4 4 Coslet 7.8 1.54 95 796 11.9% 61.6 5 Haslett 6.8 1.49 63 694 9.1% 42.2 6 Williams 3.5 1.45 33 347 9.5% 22.8 7 Payton 14.0 1.44 144
1264″ 11.4% 100.2
8 Reich 3.0 1.41 40 274 14.6% 28.3 9 Jackson 3.5 1.41 28 352 8.0% 19.8 10 Henning 7.0 1.40 80 743 10.8% 57.1 11 McVay 4.0 1.38 41 397 10.3% 29.6 12 Harbaugh, John 13.0 1.36 127 1408 9.0% 93.1
13 Parcells 19.0 1.36 243
2144″ 11.3% 178.3
14 McDermott 4.0 1.35 38 402 9.5% 28.1 15 Walton 7.0 1.33 78 768 10.2% 58.6 16 Belichick 26.0 1.33 280
2647″ 10.6% 210.4
17 Wyche 12.0 1.31 102
1134″ 9.0% 78.1
18 Coryell 3.5 1.30 28 325 8.6% 21.5 19 Shurmur 4.0 1.30 29 409 7.1% 22.3 20 Schottenheimer 20.5 1.29 193
2160″ 8.9% 149.6
21 Ryan, Buddy 7.0 1.29 58 794 7.3% 45.0
22 Meyer 6.0 1.24 54 609 8.9% 43.6 23 Ditka 13.0 1.23 149
1407″ 10.6% 120.7
24 Del Rio 11.9 1.23 121 1225 9.9% 98.4
25 Tobin 4.6 1.22 32 477 6.7% 26.2 26 McCarthy 13.8 1.22 123
1341″ 9.2% 101.2
27 O’Brien 6.3 1.20 58 678 8.6% 48.4 28 Kotite 6.0 1.19 47 630 7.5% 39.4 29 Quinn 5.3 1.18 43 475 9.1% 36.3 30 Jauron 8.9 1.18 81 991 8.2% 68.5 31 Stallings 3.7 1.18 28 371 7.5% 23.7 32 Kelly 4.0 1.18 31 420 7.4% 26.3 33 Bradley 3.9 1.17 26 406 6.4% 22.1 34 Koetter 3.0 1.16 14 261 5.4% 12.0 35 Marchibroda 7.0 1.16 52 678 7.7% 44.7 36 Johnson 9.0 1.15 85 976 8.7% 74.0 37 Rhodes 5.0 1.14 41 545 7.5% 36.0 38 Mora Jr. 4.0 1.14 35 410 8.5% 30.8
39 Rivera 9.8 1.14 75 968 7.7% 66.0 40 Zimmer 7.0 1.13 53 680 7.8% 46.9 41 Lewis 16.0 1.11 127
1651″ 7.7% 114.6
42 Gase 5.0 1.10 30 486 6.2% 27.3 43 Shanahan, Mike 19.3 1.09 156 1970 7.9% 142.5
44 Martz 5.3 1.09 39 464 8.4% 35.7 45 Shula, Dave 4.4 1.09 33 435 7.6% 30.2
46 Seifert 11.0 1.09 96 1018 9.4% 88.2 47 Tice 4.1 1.07 25 371 6.7% 23.3 48 Phillips, Wade 9.1 1.07 76 918 8.3% 71.2
49 Lynn 4.0 1.06 28 367 7.6% 26.4 50 Wannstedt 10.6 1.05 91 1107 8.2% 86.7 51 Kubiak 9.8 1.04 79 991 8.0% 75.7 52 Cowher 15.0 1.04 134
1611″ 8.3% 128.4
53 Ross 8.6 1.04 67 921 7.3% 64.3 54 Smith, Mike 7.0 1.04 51 676 7.5% 49.1
55 Morris 3.7 1.03 28 353 7.9% 27.1 56 Carroll 15.0 1.03 113
1542″ 7.3% 109.3
57 Gregg 5.0 1.03 33 512 6.4% 31.9 58 Shula, Don 13.0 1.03 117 1169 10.0% 113.5
59 Caldwell 7.0 1.03 45 671 6.7% 43.7 60 Tomlin 14.0 1.02 108
1410″ 7.7% 106.3
61 Erickson 6.0 1.02 36 636 5.7% 35.5 62 Marrone 6.0 1.01 41 664 6.2% 40.6 63 Arians 7.8 1.01 48 787 6.1% 47.6 64 Ryan, Rex 7.9 1.00 56 872 6.4% 55.9
65 Mularkey 5.0 1.00 37 578 6.4% 37.1 66 Mangini 5.0 0.99 36 485 7.4% 36.3 67 Fisher 22.2 0.99 146
2104″ 6.9% 148.1
68 Levy 11.4 0.98 87 1159 7.5% 88.6 69 Gruden, Jay 5.3 0.97 33 513 6.4% 34.1
70 Campo 3.0 0.97 22 319 6.9% 22.8 71 Crennel 5.9 0.96 40 566 7.1% 41.5 72 Childress 4.6 0.96 32 472 6.8% 33.3 73 Hanifan 3.3 0.95 25 348 7.2% 26.3 74 Gailey 5.0 0.95 32 507 6.3% 33.7 75 Dungy 13.0 0.94 97 1254 7.7% 102.7 76 Shanahan, Kyle 4.0 0.94 28 374 7.5% 29.8
77 Munchak 3.0 0.94 21 320 6.6% 22.4 78 Whisenhunt 8.0 0.94 43 768 5.6% 46.0 79 Burns 6.0 0.93 54 659 8.2% 57.9 80 Spagnuolo 3.3 0.93 20 360 5.6% 21.5 81 Mariucci 8.7 0.93 61 882 6.9% 65.7 82 Gibbs 14.0 0.92 102
1482″ 6.9% 111.2
83 Glanville 8.1 0.92 56 757 7.4% 61.1 84 Marinelli 3.0 0.90 18 274 6.6% 19.9 85 Reid 22.0 0.90 150
2314″ 6.5% 167.0
86 McGinnis 3.4 0.89 22 332 6.6% 24.6 87 Coughlin 20.0 0.89 134
2083″ 6.4% 150.3
88 Harbaugh, Jim 4.0 0.89 35 474 7.4% 39.5
89 Fassel 7.0 0.87 44 807 5.5% 50.3 90 Smith, Lovie 11.0 0.87 71 1225 5.8% 81.3
91 Shell 6.8 0.87 39 647 6.0% 44.7 92 Davis 3.7 0.87 22 393 5.6% 25.3 93 Garrett 6.5 0.86 57 869 6.6% 66.3 94 Nolan 3.4 0.86 17 356 4.8% 19.8 95 Walsh 6.0 0.86 43 650 6.6% 50.2 96 Noll 9.0 0.85 59 970 6.1% 69.2 97 Vermeil 8.0 0.85 43 775 5.5% 50.7 98 Capers 8.0 0.84 50 876 5.7% 59.3 99 Fontes 8.3 0.84 40 741 5.4% 47.5 100 Philbin 4.3 0.83 18 351 5.1% 21.8 101 Berry 5.5 0.82 37 656 5.6% 45.3 102 Edwards 8.0 0.82 45 811 5.5% 55.2 103 Turner 14.8 0.82 81 1398 5.8% 99.3 104 Green 12.9 0.81 73 1249 5.8% 90.3 105 Schwartz 5.0 0.81 29 511 5.7% 36.0 106 Bowles 4.0 0.81 23 440 5.2% 28.5 107 Sparano 4.6 0.80 27 475 5.7% 33.8 108 Pagano 5.3 0.79 28 530 5.3% 35.3 109 Gruden, Jon 14.0 0.79 88 1456 6.0% 111.2
110 Sherman 6.0 0.78 39 621 6.3% 49.7 111 Flores, Tom 8.0 0.78 44 845 5.2% 56.4
112 Holmgren 17.0 0.77 106
1710″ 6.2% 137.9
113 Infante 6.0 0.76 31 576 5.4% 40.5 114 Rogers 3.7 0.76 23 376 6.1% 30.4 115 Robinson 9.0 0.74 54 922 5.9% 72.5 116 Campbell, Marion 5.8 0.73 28 619 4.5% 38.3
117 Reeves 20.8 0.72 97 2104 4.6% 135.3 118 Mora Sr. 14.5 0.71 69 1409 4.9% 96.6
119 Fox 15.8 0.71 76 1630 4.7% 106.6 120 Knox 12.0 0.71 54 1141 4.7% 76.1 121 Bugel 5.0 0.70 37 482 7.7% 53.1 122 Frazier 3.4 0.69 13 339 3.8% 18.8 123 Pardee 4.6 0.68 6 140 4.3% 8.8 124 McCoy 4.0 0.66 17 367 4.6% 25.7 125 Switzer 4.0 0.64 19 361 5.3% 29.6 126 Jones 3.6 0.62 14 320 4.4% 22.5 127 Perkins 3.8 0.59 12 360 3.3% 20.5 128 Landry 6.0 0.57 22 630 3.5% 38.4 129 Riley 3.0 0.55 10 340 2.9% 18.2 130 Billick 9.0 0.52 43 1062 4.0% 82.7 131 Mackovic 4.0 0.51 14 450 3.1% 27.4 1
by Travis // May 13, 2021 – 10:32 am
The head coaches with a minimum of three seasons who were least likely to go for it on fourth-and-1 include Mouse Davis …
Mouse Davis was a head coach in college, the USFL, the WLAF, and Arena, but never in the NFL. Butch Davis, perhaps?
2
by Aaron Schatz // May 13, 2021 – 10:34 am
In reply to Mouse Davis ? by Travis
I’ll fix that.
3
by trammo7 1 // May 13, 2021 – 12:48 pm
Is one of the most aggressive coaches of all time? The same Bruce Coslet who kickings a FG on first down at the 11 yard cable in OT? Fooled me.
4
by Testicular Tactics // May 13, 2021 – 12:54 pm
RIP Marty Schottenheimer. He was almost as aggressive as Belichick? Wowsers!
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